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Chapter 5
Evolving  Chineseness, Ethnicity and Business: 
The Making of the Ethnic Chinese as a 
“Market-Dominant Minority” in Indonesia
Hoon Chang Yau
1. Introduction
The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia play a very significant role in the nation’s 
economy. Their dominance in the Indonesian economy is often seen as 
disproportionate to their numbers, as reflected in the popular assertion that 
“the Chinese constitute only 3.5 percent of the population but control 
70 percent of Indonesia’s economy” (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
May 28, 1998, cited in Chua, 2008). In the New York Times bestseller, 
World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic 
Hatred and Global Instability, Amy Chua (2004) identified Chinese 
Indonesians as one of the “ market-dominant minorities” in the world. Her 
book highlights the double bind of free market democracy: it privileges 
certain ethnic minorities to dominate the market and accumulate wealth 
on the one hand, and also allows a frustrated indigenous majority to pit 
against the wealthy ethnic minority on the other. The book, which became 
phenomenally popular among the  Chinese Indonesians in Indonesia, cited 
the May 1998 anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia as a prime example of its 
thesis. Although it does not offer any solution to their predicament, to 
many Chinese Indonesians, the book has provided a logical explanation 
to the vulnerable position of the Chinese minority in Indonesia.
The ethnic Chinese have been stereotypically portrayed in Indonesia’s 
public sphere as economic creatures and wealthy business people. While it 
is true that a large proportion of Indonesia’s private economy pre-1998 was 
dominated by a handful of Chinese conglomerates, the characterization of 
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 Chinese Indonesians as “ market-dominated minority” is not applicable to 
all — there are many poor Chinese in Tangerang and Singkawang, for 
instance. Nevertheless, politicians, academics, popular literature, presses 
and media have repeatedly reinforced such stereotype making it pervasive 
and entrenched in the popular imagination of many Indonesians. Against 
such generalization, Christian Chua argues that Chinese tycoons and 
Chinese minority “do not share more than the same ethnic ascription,” as 
he sought to “analytically de-link” the two in his book (Chua, 2008, p. 3). 
Gilman reminds us that stereotypes are “the product of history and of a 
culture that perpetuates them” (Gilman, 1985, p. 20). This chapter addresses 
how the Chinese have been constructed and constituted as a “market-
dominant minority” through an examination of the changes in the identity 
and societal and economic role of the Chinese in Indonesian history.
Ethnicity can be used (or misused) to serve the interests of power 
holders. Under the pretext of nation building, governments can manipulate 
ethnicity by developing cultural policies to suit this objective. The state 
often appeals to common paradigms of “race,” culture, nation, blood and 
soil when promoting nationalism for most people still regard identities 
based on culture, society and nation-state as absolute, essential and sub-
stantial. To them, “culture is organic, territory bound, and normative; a 
society is a bounded community; a nation-state has only one cultural 
system which eventually leads to the assimilation of people with different 
cultures” (Wu, 1997, pp. 142–143). Such paradigm is problematic not 
least because it homogenizes culture and identity, and ignores the possi-
bility of multiple identities that people may assert at different times or 
even at the same time. As different regimes in Indonesia homogenized and 
manipulated the Chinese ethnicity, the heterogeneity within this ethnicity 
was disregarded and denied. This is one of the reasons why Chinese 
Indonesians persist to be a distinct ethnic group, which becomes a ready 
target of violence and attacks during times of social unrests and regime 
changes.
2. The Heterogeneous and Evolving Chinese Identity
The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have been flexible, responsive and 
 ingenious in their adaptation to change. Their identity has been multiplied 
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in accord with their degrees of adaptation and acculturation to their local 
circumstances. The different manifestations of  Chineseness in different 
political periods in Indonesia indicate that identities are not static, but are 
dynamic and can be transformed and redefined. The ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia have never been a homogeneous group. Regional and class 
diversity partly account for their heterogeneous self-identification. 
Chineseness in Medan, for instance, is different from Chineseness in 
Jakarta, Pontianak, Bangka, Semarang, Sukabumi or Malang.
The ethnic Chinese are culturally heterogeneous and can be 
grouped differently in different periods. Conventionally, scholars have 
divided them into two main groups, the China-oriented  totok (China-
born, pure blood) and the acculturated  peranakan (local-born or mixed 
blood). Although centuries of residence in Indonesia caused peranakan 
men (most immigrants being male) to intermarry with local women, to 
adopt local culture and to lose many of the features of their Chineseness, 
by 1900, they were still unable to fully assimilate into the native popu-
lation. The main obstacles to assimilation include colonial racial policy, 
religion, economic position and the Chinese sense of cultural superior-
ity. The identity of the peranakan was by no means unified, though it 
is worth noting that it was racially and patrilineally defined, i.e., the 
group was defined and constituted by the race and gender of 
immigrants.
In contrast to the earlier, predominantly male migrations, the immi-
grants who arrived in Indonesia at the end of the 19th century included a 
significant number of women. As a result, it became possible for Chinese 
men to take a China-born wife rather than a native or peranakan, and 
these immigrants formed the distinct totok community. The totok com-
munity, nevertheless, was not a unified group as they came from different 
parts of China and spoke in different Chinese dialects. The totok were 
generally more politically orientated to China. The totok-peranakan dis-
tinction, however, is not fixed and has been subject to change. The tradi-
tional  distinction based on “race” and birthplace became unrealistic after 
the Great Depression when migration of Chinese from China into 
Indonesia halted. Scholars subsequently used a socio-cultural definition 
to replace the  previous definition of totok and peranakan. According to 
this distinction, a totok refers to a Chinese who had a Chinese-orientated 
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upbringing and who use the Chinese language as the medium of commu-
nication even though he/she was born in Indonesia. Similarly, a  perana-
kan refers not only to the Chinese with mixed ancestry, but also to those 
pure-blood Chinese who were born locally and who could not speak 
Chinese.
To understand the complex identities that the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia have assumed at different times and the multiple identities that 
they assert at the same time, it is necessary to understand how the Chinese 
have perceived themselves and others, and the extent to which they have 
been willing to identify with their  Chineseness. It is also necessary to 
understand how they have been regarded and how their ethnicity has been 
constructed by indigenous Indonesians (hereafter, pribumi), and the will-
ingness of the pribumi to accept them as one of their own. In order to 
achieve such understanding, it will be useful to examine the common 
stereotypical identities portrayed and perceived by the Chinese  themselves 
and by the  pribumi.
Stereotyping is a method of processing information that involves a 
reduction of images and ideas to a simple and manageable form. As there 
is no real line between the “self” and the “other,” stereotypes function as 
an imaginary line that serves to set “them” apart from “us” (Gilman, 
1985). Pribumi have commonly perceived the Chinese in these stereo-
types: They are a homogeneous and changeless group. They exploit our 
economy and are rich. They feel superior and exclusive. Their loyalty to 
Indonesia is questionable. They are reluctant to assimilate (Coppel, 1983, 
pp. 5–27). The next section will explore the constructions of these stereo-
types in Indonesian history.
3.  The Making of the “Market-Dominant Minority” 
in Indonesian History
The journey of the ethnic Chinese in becoming a “market-dominating 
minority” began during the Dutch colonial period when they played the 
role of economic middlemen. Chinese immigrants in the 19th and early 
20th century in Dutch East Indies found assimilation into native society 
virtually impossible. This was largely due to the Dutch “divide-and-rule” 
policies and the structure of colonial society. The population in colonial 
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Indonesia was divided into three racial groups with different legal rights 
and privileges: the Europeans were at the top, the Foreign Orientals 
(mainly Chinese) were in the middle and the natives were at the bottom. 
The economic activities of the Chinese were circumscribed by the Dutch 
administration: the Agrarian Law of 1860 prohibited them from owning 
land, thereby preventing them from engaging in agriculture; and they were 
excluded from becoming civil servants as they were not allowed from 
 taking the civil servant examination. These restrictions left them with few 
options but to engage in trade and retail activities (Diao and Tan, 2004).
Before the end of the 19th century, the Dutch granted a small number 
of Chinese monopoly privileges to engage in profitable but “immoral” 
activities (read: revenue farming), such as the selling of opium and the 
operation of gambling establishments and pawnshops. The Chinese were 
also involved in the much hated enterprise of tax and debt collection. In 
granting the Chinese these licences, the government collected licence fees 
in return. This proved to be an inexpensive and simple means of raising 
official revenues. The privileges given to these Chinese, and their domi-
nance in the retail market, contributed to the construction of the stereotype 
that the Chinese dominated the economy.
Under these conditions, for the Chinese to assimilate into indigenous 
society would have meant a drop in social status and the loss of some of 
the business privileges. The  pribumi resented the revenue farmers and 
perceived the Chinese as “natural enemies of the indigenous, sucking their 
blood and exploiting them, thwarting their economic development” (Phoa, 
1992, p. 14). In 1900, in order to protect the natives’ rights, the Dutch 
implemented the Ethical Policy for “native betterment,” but it came at 
Chinese expense. The grievances of the Chinese at that time include the 
ban on revenue farming; paying higher taxes; and the restrictions resulting 
from the pass and zoning systems, which required them to live in specific 
urban ghettos and to obtain visas if they wanted to travel. The Ethical 
Policy discriminated against the Chinese, destroyed assimilation pro-
cesses and changed the Chinese position from being the “protégés of the 
rulers to becoming the foremost enemy of the state” (Phoa, 1992, p. 14).
The widespread resentment caused by Dutch “apartheid” policies and 
the inability to attain European or local identity catalyzed many  perana-
kan Chinese to move in a direction which enhanced their Chinese identity. 
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Around 1900, partly through mass immigration of the Chinese to 
Southeast Asia, sentiments of Chinese nationalism were spread to the 
region, causing diverse Chinese communities in the Dutch Indies to mobi-
lize and identify with a greater “imagined community” of a pan-Chinese 
nation. The rise of pan-Chinese nationalism in Java was manifest in the 
emergence of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan (THHK or the Chinese 
Organization) which fostered educational and cultural nationalism; the 
Sianghwee (Chinese Chamber of Commerce) which encouraged commer-
cial nationalism; and a  peranakan Chinese newspaper, Sin Po, which 
promoted political nationalism.
3.1 Contested citizenship in post-colonial Indonesia
“They have been here since the time of our ancestors. In fact, they are real 
Indonesians who live and die in Indonesia. However, because of a political 
sleight of hand, they have suddenly become foreigners who are not 
 foreign” (Pramoedya Ananta Toer, famous Indonesian writer, 1998, p. 54).
After Indonesia gained Independence, the ethnic Chinese were faced with 
the quandary of citizenship. A Citizenship Act that aimed at a demonstra-
tion of loyalty to Indonesia was introduced in 1958. This Act adopts an 
“active system” by which Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent would 
lose their citizenship if they failed to make an official declaration to reject 
Chinese citizenship. When this Act was fully implemented in 1960, there 
were two main categories of Chinese in Indonesia: the Warga Negara 
Indonesia (or Indonesian citizens, WNI) who were mainly  peranakan, and 
the Warga Negara Asing (or foreign citizens, WNA) who were mainly 
 totok. The WNA Chinese were further divided into citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and “stateless” Chinese who were either Taiwan 
nationals or those who dissociated themselves from PRC and Taiwan. 
However, as a result of the historic division and prejudices between the 
 pribumi and Chinese, many government officials and pribumi considered 
both totok and peranakan alike, regardless of their nationality, as undesir-
able “aliens” by and discriminated against them.
Postcolonial Indonesia’s economic policies show evidence of discrimi-
nations against the Chinese, irrespective of their nationality. The move to 
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“Indonesianize” the economy by the Sukarno administration should more 
accurately be described as the “indigenization” of the  economy. Many 
discriminatory measures that were implemented against the WNA equally 
affected the WNI Chinese. The Othering of the Chinese as a whole became 
clear when the government introduced the “Benteng” (Fortress) Program 
in 1950 to promote the development of an indigenous business class (Thee, 
2006). The program gave priority and special privileges for  pribumi 
Indonesians to participate in the economy, which drew a line between 
pribumi and non-pribumi instead of between Indonesians and foreigners. 
The program, which proved to be a failure, gave rise to the “Ali Baba” 
practice where business licenses issued to indigenous Indonesians were 
channeled into companies financed and managed by the ethnic Chinese. 
Pribumi licence holders would receive remuneration as directors of the 
company with little or no participation in the business (Diao and Tan, 
2004). Another anti-Chinese campaign known as the “Assaat Movement” 
was launched in 1956 to urge the government to give preferential economic 
treatment to pribumi rather than to WNI Chinese, in order to compensate 
the pribumi for their weak positions created by colonial Dutch policy.
The regulation that hit the Chinese the hardest was the law prohibiting 
retail trade by WNA in rural areas. This regulation known as the 
Presidential Decree No.10 (PP-10) was enacted in November 1959. Since 
the Citizenship Act of 1958 was only fully implemented in 1960, the 
nationality of most Chinese was still ambiguous when the PP-10 was 
promulgated. Thus, although the PP-10 was only officially directed at 
WNA, the WNI Chinese experienced similar distress and insecurity as the 
line of distinction between foreigners and citizens was still unclear. Some 
WNI Chinese, especially the  peranakan, supported the PP-10 to show 
their loyalty to Indonesia and their separateness from the  totok (Suryadinata, 
1978). The wash from PP-10 was dramatic: the dissociation of some 
 peranakan from the totok; a general increase in consciousness of their 
problematic identity among the ethnic Chinese; and more than a hundred 
thousand Chinese (mostly WNA) left for China.
The Chinese in Indonesia have been rendered scapegoats or conveni-
ent targets of social hostility at times of regime change or when established 
authority is shaken. They have suffered a long history of persecution since 
the first ethnic cleansing carried out by the Dutch in Java in 1740. One of 
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the most brutal forms of this phenomenon was manifest when President 
Sukarno’s regime collapsed in 1965 as a result of an abortive coup attempt 
known as the 30th September Movement (G30S). This coup attempt 
 provided the legitimacy for a military offensive against the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI). After the coup, a surge of anti- Communist and 
anti-Chinese sentiment swept through the country as  Communists and 
Chinese were held responsible for the alleged role of the PRC in the abor-
tive coup. In the process, many Chinese suffered great loss of property and 
lives. Even though this number is relatively small  compared to the number 
of  pribumi that were slain at that time, what  cannot be overlooked is the 
mass hysteria that followed the crisis. Anti-Chinese episodes occurred in 
different parts of Indonesia until 1967 when anti-Chinese sentiments 
finally began to subside. However, oppression of Chinese identity 
increased after 1967 under the pretext of “anti-Communism,” as part of the 
Suharto regime’s “paranoia.”
3.2 Being the “minor-wives” of Suharto’s New Order regime
“He [Suharto] used them [the Chinese] but he did not want to acknowl-
edge that because it could become a political liability for him. Never 
once did he give us [Chinese] a decent place within the New Order 
because he wanted to keep things — including the credit for what his 
government achieved — for himself. It was sadly fitting that the New 
Order should later collapse amid the rubble of anti-Chinese riots. We 
[Chinese] were treated as minor wives, enjoyed but not recognized” 
(Jusuf Wanandi, prominent Chinese Indonesian, 2012, pp. 126–127).
The allegations that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were linked to the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and that both parties were involved in 
the September 1965 abortive coup determined the fate of the Chinese in 
New Order Indonesia. After assuming power in 1966, Suharto systemati-
cally repressed any expression of Chinese ethnic, cultural and religious 
identities.  Chineseness during the New Order was an imposed rather than 
a self-identified identity. Chinese identity was artificially constructed by 
the regime and juxtaposed as an internal and hostile “other” to the “true” 
indigenous Indonesian (Aguilar Jr., 2001). The dominant society and state 
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institutions persisted in viewing as outsiders, and imposed  discriminatory 
policies on them.
In the process of making the ethnic Chinese an internal outsider, the 
New Order imposed a social stigma on the Chinese as exclusive, asocial, 
rich and China (hence,  Communist) -oriented. This stigmatization of the 
ethnic Chinese was manifest in the reformulation and institutionalization 
of the “Chinese problem” in Indonesia. The ethnic Chinese — their 
 culture, their religion, their role in the nation’s economy, and their very 
existence — were labeled by New Order politicians as a national problem. 
The government legitimized its policies, which marginalized the ethnic 
Chinese in all social, educational, political and religious arenas, in an 
attempt to solve the “problem.”
During the Cold War period, suspicions that the Chinese Indonesians 
were a potential “fifth column” of China were strongly felt. The suspi-
cious climate resulted in local governments’ and  pribumi’s distrust of 
ethnic Chinese and justified their discrimination and cultural oppression. 
The New Order viewed anything related to Chineseness as linked to the 
Communists and thus as threatening to national interests. Even though 
this paranoia faded after the Cold War and Sino–Indonesian relations were 
normalized in the early 1990s, it never disappeared completely.
In 1991, Siswono, then State Minister for People’s Housing, issued a 
paper listing nine “sins” of the ethnic Chinese which he thought had 
“marred their image” (cited in Tan, 1995, pp. 16–17). The nine “sins” of 
the ethnic Chinese which he listed are:
1. They live exclusively in their own area;
2. Some companies have a preference to recruit people of Chinese 
descent;
3. Some companies discriminate in salary in favor of the ethnic Chinese 
workers;
4. There are some who discriminate between ethnic Chinese and ethnic 
Indonesians in their behavior toward clients, in their business 
relations;
5. They do not show social solidarity and togetherness with the ethnic 
Indonesians in their neighborhood;
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6. There are those whose sense of national identity is still very weak, and 
who treat Indonesia solely as a place to live and earn a living;
7. There are those who in their daily life still speak Chinese and who 
adhere to their traditions, and do not even know Indonesian customs, 
and who make no effort to speak Indonesian well;
8. There are those who view their Indonesian citizenship as a legality 
only;
9. There are those who feel superior toward other population groups.
Three of these “sins” are related to the business practices of this ethnic 
group. The prominent role of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia’s economy 
contributed to negative stereotyping. This is also due to the fact that a 
disproportionate number of Chinese became very wealthy under the New 
Order and some of them seemed to flaunt their wealth in extravagant life-
styles — a circumstance that was perceived as a problem by the  pribumi 
when juxtaposed to the poverty of many Indonesians.
The New Order did not follow in the footsteps of Sukarno’s policy in 
indigenizing Indonesia’s economy. Instead, the development-oriented 
Suharto government utilized Chinese business skills to recover the sinking 
economy. The government’s embarkation on a market-oriented economic 
strategy could not have succeeded without opening the way for the 
Chinese to participate as fully as possible in economic life because they 
alone had the commercial experience and ready access to foreign capital. 
Mackie notes that, “Their contribution to the economic transformation of 
the country since 1966–1967 has far exceeded that of the pribumi busi-
nessmen and state enterprises” (1991, p. 91). The New Order government, 
however, had never acknowledged the economic and other contributions 
of the Chinese to the nation. This prompted Jusuf Wanandi — a prominent 
Chinese who had worked closely with the New Order regime — to 
lament, “We [ Chinese Indonesians] were treated as minor wives, enjoyed 
but not recognized” (2012, p. 127).
Privileges and opportunities provided by the New Order bolstered the 
positions of Chinese business interests, contributing to the rapid growth of 
Chinese economic power. However, in restricting the conception of the 
Chinese to that of players in the economic arena, state policies in Indonesia 
fostered an image of the Chinese as “economic creatures.” Commercial 
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success unwittingly demonized the Chinese and stirred up anti-Chinese 
sentiments as they were identified with greed and other  negative values, 
and as villains who secured their gains through  exploitation, corruption 
and collusion to the detriment of the  pribumi.
A small group of Chinese, referred to as the cukong, became very 
wealthy through cooperation with the Indonesian power elite — usually 
members of the military. Some of them were cronies of Suharto. The close 
ties that the ethnic Chinese business community developed with the 
 military regime were known collectively as the cukong system. The 
cukong provides skills and capital in running the business while 
the pribumi partner gives protection and various facilities to the cukong. 
These personal ties served to protect the Chinese from potential  harassment 
as a non-pribumi ethnic minority identified with commercial monopoly 
power. The logic was this: since the Chinese had a weak political base and 
were in a vulnerable position, allowing them to dominate the economy 
would not pose a political threat to the military’s rule in the way an 
 independent indigenous business class might. With this arrangement, the 
ruling regime could ensure that they had a certain degree of control over 
the private sector (Lim and Gosling, 1997).
The unfair advantage provided by the cukong system created resent-
ment among some pribumi, particularly among the less successful busi-
nessmen who were supported by Islamic groups and among the opponents 
of the Suharto administration. This could be seen in the well-known 
 anti-cukong campaign staged by these people in 1971 (Suryadinata, 
1988). One common criticism was that the pribumi felt that they were not 
the masters in their own nation (bukan tuan di negeri sendiri) because they 
perceived their economy as being controlled by the Chinese who were 
(and, to some extent, still are) regarded as foreigners.
On many occasions,  Chinese Indonesian conglomerates were  criticized 
for “capital flight” because of their reportedly massive investments in 
China, especially in infrastructure, which Indonesia also desperately 
needed. It has not helped that the most prominent Indonesian businessmen 
investing in China were  totok Chinese. In fact, most of the cukong or con-
glomerates were totok. Mackie (1991) notes that totok were almost solely 
responsible for the expansion of Chinese businesses across Indonesia in 
the early 20th century, when they carried out small business in the more 
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remote rural areas where  peranakan had been reluctant to operate. Few 
peranakan were attracted toward the risks and discomforts of such 
 activities; their greater access to education and more settled lifestyle 
inclined them toward salaried and professional jobs. Also, only  totok still 
had a good command of the Chinese language and hence were able to 
communicate with other Chinese in the region. The expression of Chinese 
culture, use of the Chinese language and lavish celebrations at Chinese 
New Year by some rich totok had inadvertently heightened doubts about 
the “loyalty” of the Chinese community as a whole, since the  pribumi 
often viewed the Chinese as a homogeneous group. Many pribumi do not 
distinguish the acts of Chinese conglomerates from those of small shop-
keepers. The behavior of these big business totok conglomerates even 
caused apprehension among the peranakan, who feared that, being less 
politically protected and more confined to the Indonesian home economy, 
they were the ones who would bear the brunt of any violent anti-Chinese 
backlash.
Although Indonesia needed the skills and business networks of the 
Chinese for national development, paradoxically, the dominant position of 
the ethnic Chinese in the nation’s economy was widely perceived to be a 
national problem. The result was the government’s endorsement and 
implementation of a military-backed assimilationist policy, directed spe-
cifically against the ethnic Chinese and aimed to repress any expression 
of Chinese identity. Suharto’s government considered that Chineseness 
was incompatible with the national personality and was problematic for 
national integration and unity. The general assumption was that identity is 
singular rather than plural, and that one could either be an Indonesian or 
a Chinese. To be completely Indonesian, the Chinese were expected to 
give up all their Chineseness (Hoon, 2006). Hence, a host of harsh 
 measures was introduced to coercively assimilate the ethnic Chinese into 
the wider Indonesian population and to make them lose their Chineseness 
and “exclusiveness.”
Because their loyalty to the country was under suspicion, the ethnic 
Chinese were not allowed to form their own political party during Suharto’s 
rule, and no Chinese were appointed to high state positions (with the 
exception of Bob Hasan in the last years of the regime). Also, entry to 
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public service, the armed forces and state-run educational institutions was 
made extremely difficult. The use of Chinese language in public places was 
strongly discouraged. Printed matter in Chinese characters fell under the 
category of prohibited imports like narcotics, pornography and explosives, 
when entering Indonesia (Heryanto, 1999). The government- sponsored 
“Indonesia Daily,” which aimed to convey the official voice of the govern-
ment, was the only permitted Chinese language press. The government also 
introduced the name-changing regulation in 1966 to encourage the ethnic 
Chinese to change their Chinese names into Indonesian-sounding ones, in 
order to “speed up assimilation” (Suryadinata, 1978).
Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent were not allowed to attend 
Chinese-medium schools after 1957. The remaining Chinese-medium 
schools, which catered to the needs of Chinese students who were not 
Indonesian citizens (i.e., the WNA), were closed in 1966. All Chinese 
were urged to enter Indonesian-medium schools, either private or public. 
After the closure of Chinese schools, it was argued that the dichotomy 
between  totok and  peranakan broke down as many younger generation 
peranakan were “Indonesianized” while their totok counterparts were 
“peranakanized” (Suryadinata, 1978). However, some wealthy Chinese 
families who wished their children to retain their  Chineseness sent them 
abroad to study in Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan or even China.
The above discussion shows that the New Order adopted a policy 
toward the Chinese similar to the divide-and-rule policy introduced by the 
Dutch colonial regime. Essentially, it was a paradoxical policy of privileg-
ing the Chinese business communities in an effort to expand the nation’s 
economy, and concomitantly marginalizing the Chinese minority to near 
pariah status in all social and cultural spheres. Heryanto argues that in the 
history of Indonesia, never before had the Chinese business elite enjoyed 
such prosperity, but ironically, never before had they been so deprived of 
civil rights (1999). This strategy aimed “to keep the Chinese dependent, 
politically powerless, and easily controllable” (Mackie, 1991, p. 92). 
Since the Chinese were marked out from the  pribumi by their assumed 
wealth, their jobs and their lifestyles, it was fairly easy to arouse anti-
Chinese feelings based on either resentment or jealousy of the supposed 
economic status of the Chinese as a whole.
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3.3 The May 1998  anti-Chinese violence
“We were increasingly aware that we were easy targets at times of 
 political turmoil. My friends who had always thought of themselves as 
Indonesian suddenly faced the fact they were actually regarded as 
Chinese, and as such deserved to be alienated. They had to seriously 
rethink what this meant and to reorientate themselves” (Zhou Fuyuan, 
 Chinese Indonesian architect, 2003, p. 454).
In the 1990s, after the Cold War and the decline of Communism, there was 
reportedly a softening in the government’s anti-Chinese stance and a 
reduced anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesian society. The visit by 
Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng to Indonesia in 1990 was seen as a 
 positive sign of change in the status of the ethnic Chinese minority in 
Indonesia. This positive development was, however, short lived. Anti-
Chinese riots once again broke out in May 1998 when the nation was in 
the midst of its economic crisis. The devastating effects of the financial 
crisis brought anti-Chinese sentiment to the surface. The Chinese were 
taken as scapegoats and held responsible for the national crisis, which was 
partly the result of massive corruption and the state’s mismanagement of 
the economy. The riots, triggered by the killing of four student protesters 
at Trisakti University, turned into a violent anti-Chinese pogrom. Properties 
owned by the ethnic Chinese were destroyed; many Chinese were attacked; 
and Chinese women were raped. Many middle- and upper-class Chinese 
families panicked and fled the country to seek refuge in safer places 
 overseas. The result was a capital flight of up to an estimated USD165 
billion, which cost the Indonesian economy dearly and hampered its 
recovery from the crisis (Chua, 2008). This behavior attracted much criti-
cism from the  pribumi community, who denounced the Chinese for being 
unpatriotic and called their nationalism into  question (van Dijk, 2001).
One might pose the question: How were the ethnic Chinese identified 
and targeted, if there were palpable signs that they had been assimilated? 
It was indeed clear that the New Order’s assimilationist policy had failed 
to solve the “Chinese Problem” and integrate the Chinese into Indonesian 
society. Suharto’s divide-and-rule policy reproduced Chineseness as a 
conceptual category ready to be manipulated in times of political crisis. 
It has been argued that the riots were systematically instigated by the state 
to divert the masses’ anger away from Suharto and his cronies and toward 
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the Chinese. The Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF) established that much 
of the violence was instigated by provocateurs who incited the local 
masses, leading the crowds to run amok and start looting and rioting. 
Heryanto contends that the riots were not provoked by spontaneous 
 racism and that the media propagated the economic-gap theory during the 
riots, escalating racist attacks on the Chinese (1999). However, others 
argued that the rioters would not have attacked the Chinese had there been 
no anti-Chinese sentiment to manipulate in the first place.
The ethnic dichotomy of  pribumi and non-pribumi constructed by the 
New Order was forcefully reproduced during the May riots. It was used to 
distinguish who should or should not be targeted, exemplified in the 
 following quote:
“Because Chinese property was specifically targeted, people tried to 
protect their shops and houses by putting up signs that the owner was a 
pribumi, a Betawi (original inhabitant of Jakarta), a Muslim, a haji, and 
so on. Citations from the Koran and texts like Alumni Trisakti, Supporter 
of Reformation, maaf milik pribumi (“owned by a pribumi”) could also 
be seen on walls and on banners” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 189).
In this way, the pribumi “self ” [poor, original inhabitant, loyal citizen, 
Muslim] were eager to differentiate themselves from the non-pribumi 
“Other” [rich, foreign, disloyal, non-Muslim], so that they could be spared 
from attack. This shows that after 32 years of the New Order’s social 
engineering, the artificial “us” and “them” binary had been internalized by 
Indonesian society. Although inter-group differences had been repressed 
during Suharto’s era under the prohibition of any discussion related to 
ethnicity, religion, race or inter-class differences, they remain very impor-
tant in both everyday life and legal identification.
4.  The Wind of Change: The Resurgence of Chineseness 
in Post-Suharto Indonesia
“The traumatic events seemed to be a wake-up call: many [Chinese] 
people, normally fearful of getting involved in politics, realized that if 
we do not take the risk and get involved, then politics would simply 
crush us” (Zhou, 2003, p. 454).
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The collapse of the New Order regime marked the return of political 
 freedom to Indonesia, including the emergence of civil society, as Indonesia 
underwent a process of democratization and Reformasi (reforms). The 
 lifting of the 32-year-old restrictions on political participation and civil 
activism allowed a myriad of political parties, action groups and non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs) to spring up. Many ethnic Chinese 
utilized this political liberalization to establish organizations to fight for the 
abolition of discriminatory laws, defend their rights and promote  solidarity 
between ethnic groups in Indonesia. Many post-Suharto Chinese organiza-
tions deploy the discourses of Indonesian nationalism to show that they are 
genuine Indonesians. This desire for authentication is particularly  significant 
for the Chinese as they have been historically constructed as non-asli (non-
indigenous) outsiders.
To affirm their ethnicity as an integral part of the nation and challenge 
the restrictive boundaries of indigeneity, Chinese organizations lobbied 
for the amendment of a clause in the 1945 Constitution which stated that, 
the “Indonesian president [should be] asli Indonesian.” Some Chinese 
have argued that nationality should be defined in terms of citizen or non-
citizen status rather than that of indigenous or non-indigenous categoriza-
tion. Others contested the narrow definition of indigeneity and contended 
that anyone who was born in Indonesia should be considered “asli”, 
including the Chinese. This debate shows not only that the ethnic Chinese 
have actively protested against the concept of nationhood based on indi-
geneity, but also that they have made a conscious effort to shed their 
“alien” image. The House of Representatives finally passed a Citizenship 
Bill in 2006, which, amongst other things, in effect abolished the distinc-
tion between “asli” and “non-asli.” Although “asli Indonesian” still exists 
as a concept, it has been redefined to include all citizens who have never 
assumed foreign citizenship of their own free will. This new Law also 
allows the Chinese to hold several key government posts, including the 
presidency, from which they were formerly excluded.
The May 1998  anti-Chinese violence brought to the surface the highly 
problematic position of the ethnic Chinese in relation to the Indonesian 
nation. One consequence of the riots has been the resurgence of Chinese 
press, culture, religion and language. For the first time in several decades, 
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Chinese identity became more visible. In May 1999, President Habibie 
issued a presidential instruction to allow the teaching of the Chinese 
 language and scrapped a regulation requiring ethnic Chinese to produce 
certificates of citizenship when registering for school or making official 
applications. Then in February 2001 President Abdurrahman Wahid lifted 
the 1978 official ban on the display of Chinese characters and the 
 importation of Chinese publications. Following these decrees, Chinese-
language  education experienced a boom in Indonesia. Among young ethnic 
Chinese as well as  pribumi, learning Mandarin has become a popular 
 pursuit, triggering a proliferation of after-school and after-work 
Mandarin courses. Nevertheless, this “resurgence” of  Chineseness in 
Indonesia needs to be read in the wider context of the recent economic rise 
of China and the ramifications of this for the Southeast Asian region. In fact, 
the national dignity regained by China in recent decades has led to greater 
respect for the Chinese in Southeast Asia. A new interest in Mandarin and 
Chinese culture is also common among Chinese and non-Chinese in other 
parts of Southeast Asia.
Under Wahid’s administration, ethnic Chinese were given greater 
freedom to assert their cultural and religious identity. President Wahid 
issued a decree in 2000 to annul Suharto’s discriminatory regulation that 
repressed any manifestation of Chinese beliefs, customs and traditions. In 
issuing the decree, Wahid assured the ethnic Chinese of their right to 
observe their cultural practices in the same way that other ethnic groups 
have enjoyed theirs. Following the amendment of the official cultural 
policy, the ethnic Chinese, for the first time in over three decades, could 
finally enjoy the freedom to celebrate Imlek (Chinese New Year) publicly 
without any restrictions. In January 2001, Wahid went a step further, 
declaring Imlek an optional holiday. In February 2002, Megawati declared 
that Imlek would be a national holiday, beginning in the year 2003 (Hoon, 
2009). This edict is a landmark decision and a further restoration of the 
cultural rights of the ethnic Chinese.
In the economic sphere, the riots of May 1998 triggered an exodus of 
ethnic Chinese and generated a capital flight. In its aftermath, President 
Habibie was faced with the insurmountable task of stabilizing the ailing 
economy. The post-Suharto regime needed Chinese capitalists to help 
b1585_Ch-05.indd   123 8/23/2013   9:20:49 AM
124 Hoon Chang Yau
b1585  Catalysts for Change: Chinese Business in Asia b1585_Ch-05 23 Aug 2013 9:21 AM
Indonesia to recover from the economic crisis (Chua, 2008). In order to 
reassure the ethnic Chinese concerning their safety in Indonesia, to stem 
further flight of their capital and to persuade Chinese Indonesians  business 
people to repatriate the capital they had transferred overseas, Habibie 
promised to carry out legislative reform to eliminate racial discrimination. 
He issued a decree in September 1998 to end the official usage of the 
discriminatory labels “ pribumi” and “non-pribumi.” This was seen as a 
declaration that indigeneity and alienness were no longer tenable distinc-
tions. The pronouncement of the edict was followed by a series of law 
reforms to abolish various kinds of discrimination.
The Asian financial crisis and the collapse of the Suharto regime had 
severe impact on some large conglomerates owned and controlled by the 
ethnic Chinese. For instance, the Indonesian government and foreign 
investors took over the private banking sector, which had largely been 
controlled by ethnic Chinese conglomerates before the crisis (Thee, 
2006). In spite of this, the ethnic Chinese are still dominating a significant 
part of Indonesian private economy, especially small and medium enter-
prises. Chua (1998) maintains that some Chinese tycoons have benefitted 
from the processes of democratization, decentralization and deregulation 
in the Reformasi period. These Chinese-owned business conglomerates 
have not only survived the crisis and recouped their losses, but have also 
worked out new strategies to navigate the new economic and political ter-
rain. This again shows the adaptability and resilience of the ethnic Chinese 
minority.
Nevertheless, the political events of May 1998 changed the future of 
the Chinese Indonesians forever. Not only were their cultural and 
 citizenship rights restored, for the first time in three decades, but the 
Chinese were now given the opportunity to explore beyond the economic 
field. The dynamic post-Suharto political scene, dominated by the growth 
of democracy and civil society, has given rise to a healthy Chinese politics. 
The ongoing political trauma suffered by many  Chinese Indonesians 
 notwithstanding, the unprecedented establishment of Chinese political 
 parties and NGOs has enabled them to become more fully integrated into 
all facets of political life in Indonesia. Through these organizations, the 
historical stereotype of the ethnic Chinese as “apolitical” and as “economic 
animals” has been challenged and debunked. It is hoped that the new 
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 liberal and inclusive political space can empower the ethnic Chinese to 
reinvent their identity as being beyond that indicated by the disenfranchis-
ing stereotype of the “market-dominant minority.”
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